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INTRODUCTION 
ew phrases are better known than “you have the right to remain 
silent, and anything you say can be used against you in a court of 
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law.”1 The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. 
Arizona had sweeping effects—and completely overhauled the way the 
criminal justice system handles criminal confessions. Before Miranda, 
courts determined the admissibility of a suspect’s statements obtained 
during police interrogation using the “voluntariness” test.2 That test 
asked whether, in the totality of the circumstances, a suspect’s will was 
overborne due to police coercion.3 The Supreme Court recognized the 
difficulty in applying that test, so it decided Miranda in order to give 
suspects more control over the interrogation process and to give courts 
and law enforcement clearer rules for determining the admissibility of 
confessions. The reasoning behind the court’s decision was that if 
suspects have control over the interrogation process, courts need not 
delve into the voluntariness analysis.4 
Miranda gave suspects control over interrogations in two important 
ways. First, police must tell suspects what their rights are during 
interrogation—that is where the warnings come into play.5 After 
warnings are given, police must obtain a voluntary and intelligent 
waiver of those rights before beginning questioning. Second, even if a 
suspect initially waives his or her Miranda rights, the suspect may 
invoke those rights at any time during questioning.6 If a suspect 
invokes his or her rights, police are prohibited from asking any further 
questions. 
While the voluntariness test still exists under the Fifth Amendment, 
it is more difficult to successfully bring a voluntariness claim after 
Miranda. That is because Miranda, in theory, gives suspects control 
over interrogation, so absent overt police misconduct, it is difficult to 
prove a suspect’s statements were coerced. Therefore, the focus of 
litigation regarding the admissibility of confessions during police 
1 George Thomas, The End of the Road for Miranda v. Arizona, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1, 12 (2000) (“[T]he typical TV viewer has heard Miranda warnings given hundreds of 
times, with no discernible effect on the ‘good guys’ getting the confession from the guilty 
suspects.”). Ask yourself: How many times have you seen a suspect on TV ask for a lawyer 
after receiving Miranda warnings? 
2 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432–35 (2000) (explaining the history 
of the Miranda warning requirement). 
3 Id. at 434. 
4 Id. at 435; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441–42 (1966) (explaining the Court 
granted certiorari “to explore some facets of the problems . . . of applying the privilege 
against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation, and to give concrete constitutional 
guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow”). 
5 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444–45. 
6 Id. (“If, however, [the suspect] indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process 
that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.”). 
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interrogation usually centers on whether police complied with 
Miranda. The problem, however, is that Miranda has arguably not 
given criminal suspects the control it promised. In the cases following 
Miranda, the United States Supreme Court has made it difficult for 
suspects to actually exert control over interrogation.7 
For example, it is relatively easy for the prosecution to show that a 
suspect waived his rights under the Fifth Amendment. That is because 
police need not obtain an explicit waiver. Instead, “[a]s a general 
proposition, the law can presume that an individual who, with a full 
understanding of his or her rights, acts in a manner inconsistent with 
their exercise has made a deliberate choice to relinquish the protection 
those rights afford.”8 Thus, while it is good police practice to ask a 
suspect whether he or she understood the warnings and agrees to talk 
to police, that is not required to show waiver. To show a suspect waived 
his or her rights, police may simply read suspects the warnings and then 
begin asking questions. If a suspect answers those questions, then, 
absent evidence otherwise, he will likely be presumed to have 
voluntarily and intelligently waived their rights. 
Suspects also face difficulty while trying to invoke their Miranda 
rights. Under current case law, in order to invoke a suspect’s right to 
have counsel present during interrogation, a suspect must make a clear 
and assertive statement. In other words, the suspect’s statement must 
meet a certain “threshold of clarity” in order for the statement to trigger 
any constitutional protection.9 To meet such a threshold, statements 
generally must be direct and assertive. For example, the statement “I 
want a lawyer” would satisfy the requirements, but the statement “give 
me a lawyer dog” might not.10 The latter example shows some of the 
7 See discussion of Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) below. One way the U.S. 
Supreme Court has rolled back the protections arguably established by Miranda is that after 
Davis it is difficult for suspects to invoke their rights. 
8 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 385 (2010). In Berghuis, the detectives asked 
the defendant to sign a form to indicate he understood his rights, but the defendant refused. 
Id. at 375. It was unclear whether the detectives obtained any verbal confirmation from the 
defendant that he understood his rights. Id. The Court nevertheless held that the defendant 
waived his rights when he chose to speak to the detectives. Id. at 387. 
9 See Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in 
Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 302–04 (1993) (discussing the “threshold of 
clarity” approach). 
10 Recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court made national news when it found that a 
suspect’s request for a “lawyer dog” was not a clear invocation. Tom Jackman, The Suspect 
Told Police ‘Give Me a Lawyer Dog.’ The Court Says He Wasn’t Asking for a Lawyer, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2017), www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2017/ 
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problems with such a rule: requiring suspects to speak in a clear and 
assertive manner “fail[s] to give legal effect to indirect modes of 
speaking [and] has negative repercussions for many groups in society” 
who do not speak in direct or assertive ways.11 
To be sure, courts face a difficult task in defining the scope of 
constitutionally permissible interrogation. Interrogation is an important 
investigative tool for law enforcement. A confession may allow police, 
who have limited resources, to spend more time and effort investigating 
other crimes.12 Confessions help prosecutors negotiate plea 
agreements, which save the time and valuable resources of not only 
prosecutors and law enforcement but courts as well.13 Finally, 
sometimes confessions are necessary to prove a crime—for example, 
“[s]ome of the most heinous crimes, such as child abuse, may involve 
no physical evidence and no witnesses, other than the child who may 
be incompetent to testify.”14 Faced with that difficulty, the United 
States Supreme Court has announced bright-line rules such as the one 
in Davis v. United States, which held that a suspect does not invoke his 
right to have an attorney present during questioning unless he 
articulates his desire to do so clearly.15 
State courts, in interpreting their respective state constitutions, are 
able to provide more protection for suspects in interrogation. Oregon 
has done so and has developed its own set of standards to guide police 
in interrogating suspects and to protect the rights afforded to suspects 
under the Oregon Constitution.16 
This Comment focuses primarily on one aspect of Miranda rights, 
namely, what happens if a suspect tries to invoke his right to counsel 
but fails to clearly articulate his desire to do so?17 Such a statement is 
11/02/the-suspect-told-police-give-me-a-lawyer-dog-the-court-says-he-wasnt-asking-for-
a-lawyer/. 
11 Ainsworth, supra note 9, at 264. Although Davis was decided after Ainsworth 
surveyed the problems associated with requiring clear invocations of Miranda rights, those 
problems are still present—perhaps even more so—under current Fifth Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
12 Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far is Too Far?, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1199 (2001). 
13 Id. at 1200. 
14 Id. at 1199. 
15 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459–60 (1994). 
16 Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution states in relevant part that “[n]o 
person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal prosecution to testify against himself.” OR. 
CONST. art. II, § 12. 
17 Miranda protects both the right to have an attorney present during questioning and the 
right to remain silent. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381 (2010). (“[T]here is 
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commonly referred to by courts as an equivocal invocation of a 
suspect’s rights. An equivocal invocation is difficult to define, but this 
Comment will attempt to articulate a workable definition.18 The test to 
determine whether a suspect invoked his or her rights in Oregon asks 
whether a reasonable officer would understand the suspect to be 
asserting his rights under the totality of the circumstances.19 The test is 
a factual one, conducted on a case-by-case basis. As a Multnomah 
County Circuit Court judge once described: “It’s not cut and dried; it’s 
not absolute. As a judge you have to look at it on a case by case 
basis.”20 
Under that standard, courts must determine whether a suspect 
invoked his Miranda rights, equivocally invoked his Miranda rights, 
or did not invoke at all. A close look at the times when a statement has 
been found to be unequivocal, or clear, and when a statement is found 
to be equivocal shows that courts tend to follow particular guidelines 
when examining the facts of each case. For example, if the suspect 
expresses a “present desire” to do something, courts are likely to find 
that the statement is an unequivocal invocation.21 By contrast, if a 
no principled reason to adopt different standards for determining when an accused has 
invoked the Miranda right to remain silent and the Miranda right to counsel at issue in 
Davis.”). This Comment discusses the right to counsel. Berghuis was incorrect in noting that 
there is no principled reason to adopt different standards for the two rights, as the U.S. 
Supreme Court has done so in other contexts. For example, the federal rule states that police 
may interrogate a suspect even after he has asserted his right to remain silent, as long as 
police “scrupulously honored” the suspect’s right. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 
104 (1975) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474, 479 (1966)). Thus, the Federal 
Constitution provides more stringent protection of the right to counsel than it does the right 
to remain silent. See Marcy Strauss, The Sounds of Silence: Reconsidering the Invocation of 
the Right to Remain Silent Under Miranda, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 733, 781 (2009). 
In Oregon, courts treat the two similarly. See State v. McAnulty, 356 Or. 432, 455, 338 P.3d 
653, 669 (2014) (holding that when a suspect unequivocally invokes her right to remain 
silent, all interrogation must cease unless the suspect waives the right). In McAnulty, the 
suspect waived her previously invoked right to remain silent after she initiated conversation 
with police. Id. at 456, 338 P.3d at 669. However, the Oregon Supreme Court did not hold 
that a suspect must first initiate conversation after invoking her right to remain silent before 
police may obtain a waiver. Under the federal rule, sufficient passage of time may be enough 
to allow police to obtain a waiver of a previous invocation in order to continue interrogation. 
See Strauss, supra, at 779 (discussing the six Mosely factors for determining whether a 
suspect’s rights were “scrupulously honored”). 
18 A suspect may also equivocally invoke his right to remain silent. In fact, many courts 
have held that silence itself is an equivocal invocation of the right to remain silent. Strauss, 
supra note 17, at 792. 
19 State v. Brown, 276 Or. App. 308, 317, 367 P.3d 544, 549–50 (2016). 
20 Melody Finnemore, Some Say the Right to Silence Is Still Golden—But Not Everyone 
Agrees, OR. ST. B. BULL., June 2016, at 17, 18. 
21 See State v. Alarcon, 259 Or. App. 462, 467–68, 314 P.3d 364, 368 (2013) (comparing 
statements where a suspect asks “when can I” to situations where a suspect asks “will I have 
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suspect makes a statement that seems as though she is inquiring about 
her future options, the statement will likely be considered an equivocal, 
or ambiguous, invocation.22 Thus, a question regarding a suspect’s 
Miranda rights may be viewed as an equivocal invocation, while a 
definitive statement may be viewed as an unequivocal request for 
counsel. The guidelines are not perfect, however. One Oregon court 
found the following statement was an equivocal invocation: “This is 
something where I need to get a lawyer. I don’t know what to do 
now.”23 The court determined that the suspect did not unequivocally 
invoke his Miranda rights based on that statement.24 
Oregon courts seemingly recognize that the distinction between 
equivocal and clear invocations is a fine one and provide special rules 
governing interrogations where the suspect equivocally invokes his 
rights. For instance, the Oregon Constitution seemingly requires police 
officers to clarify whether the suspect wishes to have an attorney 
present during questioning even if the suspect only equivocally invokes 
his right to counsel. To properly clarify, police must ask only “neutral 
questions” aimed at determining whether the suspect intended to 
invoke his Miranda rights.25 Clarification arguably has a similar effect 
as the Miranda warnings—like the warnings themselves, clarification 
helps inform suspects of their constitutional rights.26 
However, as discussed below, the Oregon Supreme Court has never 
expressly held that the duty exists and therefore has not explained the 
contours of the rule. For example, the Oregon Court of Appeals held in 
State v. Roberts that the suspect’s question, “Do I need one?” was not 
an equivocal request for an attorney.27 The suspect asked whether he 
needed “one” immediately after he was read his Miranda warnings.28 
The court held that because “the only reasonable interpretation of 
defendant’s question is that he had not yet formed any intent to invoke 
an opportunity to”—the latter situation is more likely to be considered an equivocal 
invocation). 
22 Id. 
23 State v. Field, 231 Or. App. 115, 118, 218 P.3d 551, 554 (2009). 
24 Id. at 124, 218 P.3d at 557. 
25 State v. Montez, 309 Or. 564, 572–73, 789 P.2d 1352, 1359 (1990). 
26 See Roscoe C. Howard Jr. & Lisa A. Rich, A History of Miranda and Why It Remains 
Vital Today, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 685, 705 (2006) (“What Miranda warnings were designed 
to do . . . is to strike a balance between law enforcement and the criminal suspect that gives 
the suspect, or any ordinary citizen, a moment to consider the rights bestowed upon them 
by the Constitution and make an informed decision about whether to waive those rights.”). 
27 State v. Roberts, 291 Or. App. 124, 133, 418 P.3d 41, 47 (2018). 
28 Id. at 126, 418 P.3d at 44. 
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his right, and was seeking additional information that the detectives 
were not required to provide.”29 As discussed below, the duty to clarify 
does provide suspects with additional information regarding their 
Miranda rights. Therefore, questions about the rights themselves 
should be considered equivocal invocations, and officers should be 
required to clarify whether suspects wish to invoke their rights. But that 
does not mean the officers in Roberts were required to tell the suspect 
that he did need a lawyer. Instead, it means that the officers should 
have, at the very least, reminded the suspect that it was up to him, but 
if he wanted an attorney to be present during questioning he was 
entitled to one. 
Other states follow the “per se” approach, which treats even 
ambiguous references to counsel as per se invocations.30 Thus, even if 
a suspect makes an unclear reference to an attorney that is not 
“sophisticated” or in the “legally proper form,” it is sufficient to invoke 
the right to counsel and end interrogation.31 Notably, a statement that 
may be considered equivocal under Oregon law may be considered an 
adequate invocation in a state that follows the per se approach. If a 
statement indicating the suspect may have intended to exercise his right 
to counsel is adequately clear, all interrogation must cease until an 
attorney is made available to the suspect.32 
By contrast, under the Federal Constitution, the standard for clarity 
is much higher—police may continue interrogation until the suspect is 
able to clearly articulate his desire to speak with an attorney.33 Under 
the federal rule, called the “threshold of clarity” approach, courts must 
ask only whether the statement was clear or unclear. If the statement 
was clear, interrogation must end.34 If it was unclear, officers can 
continue to ask questions.35 While the federal rule may be easier for 
courts to adjudicate, it also makes it difficult to invoke Miranda rights 
29 Id. at 133, 418 P.3d at 47. 
30 See People v. Traubert, 608 P.2d 342, 346 (Colo. 1980); State v. Elmore, 500 A.2d 
1089, 1092 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985); Hunt v. State, 632 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1982). 
31 Traubert, 608 P.2d at 346 (quoting People v. Harris, 552 P.2d 10, 12 (Colo. 1976)). 
32 Id. 
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because officers do not have to clarify the suspect’s intentions when he 
is unable to clearly articulate his desire to invoke his rights.36 
The United States Supreme Court adopted the threshold of clarity 
approach as the federal rule in Davis.37 In doing so, however, it 
recognized there are problems with ignoring equivocal invocations. 
Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, stated: “We recognize that 
requiring a clear assertion of the right to counsel might disadvantage 
some suspects who—because of fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic 
skills, or a variety of other reasons—will not clearly articulate their 
right to counsel although they actually want to have a lawyer 
present.”38 The Court therefore recognized that some suspects may 
have difficulty meeting the threshold of clarity required to invoke their 
right to an attorney after Davis. However, in the next sentence, the 
majority ignored those concerns, noting that under the Federal 
Constitution, “the primary protection afforded suspects subject to 
custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings themselves.”39 
Oregon courts have decided that requiring police to clarify equivocal 
invocations strikes the proper balance between honoring a suspect’s 
constitutional rights and allowing police to thoroughly investigate 
crimes. If officers are required to clarify ambiguous invocations, it may 
be easier for suspects to invoke their Miranda rights. However, if after 
being asked clarifying questions, suspects remain unable to make it 
clear to police that they are asserting their rights, police may continue 
questioning.40 Under the Oregon Constitution, therefore, suspects 
arguably have heightened protection compared to the protection 
provided under the Federal Constitution. However, under Oregon law, 
not every suspect who equivocally invokes his or her right to counsel 
receives the benefit of being asked clarifying questions. In the Oregon 
Supreme Court case State v. Meade, the court created an exception to 
the duty to clarify based on the rule of initiation.41 Therefore, in cases 
in which the rule of initiation applies, police have no duty to clarify 
equivocal invocations. This Comment takes a second look at Meade. 
36 See Marcy Strauss, Understanding Davis v. United States, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1011, 
1056 (2007) (“[T]here is some evidence to support the theory that women and minorities 
often phrase requests for counsel in ways that the courts interpret as ambiguous.”). 
37 Davis, 512 U.S. at 461. 
38 Id. at 460. 
39 Id. 
40 See People v. Duff, 317 P.3d 1148, 1169 (Cal. 2014). 
41 See discussion of State v. Meade, 327 Or. 335, 340, 963 P.2d 656, 660 (1998), in Part 
III below. 
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Although the decision was correctly decided, it is problematic that 
some suspects, who for whatever reason are unable to invoke their 
rights clearly, are not afforded the chance to clarify their intent. This 
Comment suggests a solution to that problem. 
Part I of this Comment addresses the basic principles established by 
Miranda regarding the right to have counsel present during 
interrogation. Next, Part II looks specifically at Oregon’s approach and 
the ongoing debate surrounding invocations. In doing so, this Comment 
will address critiques that Meade was inconsistent with prior Supreme 
Court decisions. Part II also argues that Meade was consistent with 
prior case law when it suggested that police officers have a duty to 
clarify equivocal invocations under the Oregon Constitution. As 
discussed in Part III, Meade adopted the rule of initiation announced in 
Edwards v. Arizona and Oregon v. Bradshaw under article I, section 
12. In doing so, Meade held that in some situations, the duty to clarify
may be obviated by the suspect’s own actions.42 In so holding, the court
relied on the rule of initiation, which states that after a suspect invokes
his right to counsel, police may not question the suspect any further
unless the suspect himself reinitiates conversation with police.43 While
the rule of initiation was correctly applied, Meade brings to light a
problem with the warnings themselves. This Comment addresses those
problems. Ultimately, this Comment will argue that the Oregon
Supreme Court should adopt a rule requiring police to clarify for
suspects (or, rather, inform suspects in the first instance) how they
should invoke their right to counsel at the outset of interrogation. Such
a rule would ensure every suspect has the opportunity to benefit from
the clarification rule, regardless of whether initiation occurs.
I 
BACKGROUND 
A. Miranda v. Arizona
The famous words “you have the right to remain silent” come from 
Miranda.44 There, the Court laid out exactly what law enforcement 
must tell a suspect at the outset of interrogation and specified that a 
42 Meade, 327 Or. at 340, 963 P.2d at 660. 
43 See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 
1039, 1044 (1983). 
44 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
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suspect must waive his rights before police begin questioning.45 The 
waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.46 However, the 
Miranda decision did more than require police to warn suspects of their 
rights. The Court also stated: 
If, however, [the suspect] indicates in any manner and at any stage of 
the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking 
there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and 
indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the 
police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have 
answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own 
does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any 
further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter 
consents to be questioned.47 
Thus, under Miranda, once a suspect is warned of his rights and 
waives them, he nevertheless may invoke them at any time during the 
interrogation. Additionally, Miranda seems to contemplate the 
possibility that a suspect may invoke his rights “in any manner” during 
interrogation.48 
While Miranda warnings provide the suspect with valuable 
information, invocation is arguably more important—as set forth 
below, invocation is how suspects are able to assert control over 
interrogation. Without the ability to assert control over interrogation, 
the purpose of Miranda is not fulfilled. Miranda allowed courts to 
move away from the “voluntariness” analysis, but with the 
understanding that a suspect was able to invoke his or her Miranda 
rights at any time. If a suspect does not, for whatever reason, have the 
ability to invoke his or her rights, then there is no longer any reason to 
move away from the voluntariness analysis.49 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 444–45. 
48 Id. at 445. 
49 The Oregon Supreme Court eventually adopted the Miranda rule under article I, 
section 12, of the Oregon Constitution. See State v. Roble-Baker, 340 Or. 631, 638, 136 
P.3d 22, 27 (2006). However, it does not appear Oregon has moved away from the
voluntariness analysis in the same way. See, e.g., State v. Belle, 281 Or. App. 206, 383 P.3d
327 (2016); State v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 273 Or. App. 627, 359 P.3d 532 (2015). If suspects
were informed at the outset of interrogation how to invoke their rights, perhaps a bigger step
away from the voluntariness test would be warranted under article I, section 12.
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B. Edwards v. Arizona
Fifteen years after Miranda, the Supreme Court decided Edwards.50 
In Edwards, the defendant was charged with robbery, burglary, and 
first-degree murder.51 The defendant was arrested at his home, 
transported to the police station, and subsequently read his Miranda 
rights.52 The defendant stated that he understood his rights and was 
willing to talk to the police.53 However, once he was informed of the 
charges against him, the defendant asked to discuss a plea arrangement 
stating, “I want an attorney before making a deal.”54 
The next day, two police detectives returned to talk with the 
defendant.55 When the detention officer informed the defendant that 
two detectives wished to speak with him, the defendant stated that he 
did not want to talk.56 The detention officer responded that the 
defendant “had to” do so.57 Before interrogating the defendant, the 
police detectives informed him of his Miranda rights for a second 
time.58 Thereafter, the defendant said that he was willing to talk to the 
detectives and implicated himself in the crime.59 
The Court held that the defendant’s statements were inadmissible 
because the police violated his Fifth Amendment rights.60 In reaching 
that conclusion, the Court clarified what was first suggested in 
Miranda—when a suspect invokes the right to have an attorney present 
during interrogation, interrogation must cease until an attorney is made 
available to the suspect.61 Because the suspect’s statement, “I want an 
attorney before making a deal,” was an invocation of the right to an 
attorney, the question was whether the defendant subsequently waived 
his rights when he agreed to talk to the police after hearing the Miranda 
warnings a second time.62 
50 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
51 Id. at 478. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 






60 Id. at 480. 
61 Id. at 485. 
62 Id. at 487. 
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The standard for establishing waiver at the outset of interrogation is 
set forth in North Carolina v. Butler.63 There, the Supreme Court held 
that in order to establish a valid wavier, an “express written or oral 
statement of waiver” is usually strong evidence that the waiver was 
valid.64 However, express waiver is not always necessary.65 Instead, 
the question is “whether the defendant in fact knowingly and 
voluntarily waived the rights delineated in [Miranda].”66 Thus, at the 
outset of interrogation, valid waiver can be established by initially 
warning the suspect of his Miranda rights as long as it is established 
that the suspect knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights, under the 
“particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the 
background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”67 
The Court in Edwards extended that holding, noting that a suspect 
may waive his rights even after he has invoked his right to have counsel 
present during interrogation.68 But, under Edwards, the Court seemed 
to suggest that the standard for establishing a waiver after the suspect 
has already invoked his right to counsel is higher than the standard set 
forth in Butler.69 The Court noted that “additional safeguards are 
necessary when the accused asks for counsel” such that a valid waiver 
cannot be established by showing that a suspect responded to further 
interrogation, even if the suspect was warned of his rights.70 Rather, 
the Court established the rule of initiation. Unless a lawyer is made 
available to the suspect or the suspect initiates further communication 
with the police, there can be no more interrogation after a suspect 
invokes the right to have counsel present.71 
However, the rule of initiation is limited. In a footnote, the Court 
noted: 
If, as frequently would occur in the course of a meeting initiated by 
the accused, the conversation is not wholly one-sided, it is likely that 
the officers will say or do something that clearly would be 
“interrogation.” In that event, the question would be whether a valid 
waiver of the right to counsel and the right to silence had occurred, 
that is, whether the purported waiver was knowing and intelligent and 
63 North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979). 
64 Id. at 373. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 374–75 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). 
68 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981). 
69 See id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 484–85. 
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found to be so under the totality of the circumstances, including the 
necessary fact that the accused, not the police, reopened the dialogue 
with authorities.72 
Thus, in Edwards, the Court held that after a suspect invokes his 
right to counsel, police cannot obtain a waiver if they initiate 
conversation with a suspect.73 Instead, the suspect himself must initiate 
the conversation.74 Edwards also did not hold that initiation by a 
suspect, on its own, would constitute a waiver of a previously invoked 
right to counsel.75 Instead the suspect must both reinitiate the 
conversation and knowingly and voluntarily waive his rights.76 
C. Oregon v. Bradshaw
The United States Supreme Court later clarified that establishing a 
post-invocation waiver based on a suspect’s initiation is a two-part 
analysis.77 In Bradshaw, the Court reversed the decision of the Oregon 
Court of Appeals, which reversed the defendant’s convictions for first-
degree manslaughter, driving while under the influence of intoxicants, 
and driving with a revoked license.78 The Oregon Court of Appeals 
reversed the defendant’s convictions because it found that the 
defendant’s Miranda rights were violated.79 
When the defendant was taken to the police station, detectives 
advised him of his rights.80 The defendant recounted details about the 
night, after which he was placed under arrest and again advised of his 
rights.81 After a detective told the defendant his theory of what had 
happened that night, the defendant stated that he “[wanted] an attorney 
before it goes very much further.”82 Thereafter, the detective stopped 
interrogation.83 However, later on, the suspect was transferred to a 
different location.84 Sometime during transportation, the defendant 
72 Id. at 486 n.9. 
73 Id. at 484–85. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 486 n.9. 
76 Id. 
77 See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 (1983). 
78 Id. at 1039–41. 
79 Id. at 1041. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 1041–42. 
83 Id. at 1042. 
84 Id. 
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asked the transporting officer, “Well, what is going to happen to me 
now?”85 The officer responded, “You do not have to talk to me. You 
have requested an attorney and I don’t want you talking to me unless 
you so desire because anything you say—because—since you have 
requested an attorney, you know, it has to be at your own free will.”86 
The defendant responded that he understood, and during the ensuing 
conversation the officer asked the defendant to take a polygraph test.87 
The defendant agreed, and the polygraph test indicated that the 
defendant was not telling the truth about what happened the night of 
the accident.88 
The Oregon Court of Appeals held that any statements made after 
the suspect invoked his rights were inadmissible.89 The court explained 
that although the defendant initiated the conversation with the officer, 
that initiation did not amount to a waiver of his rights after he invoked 
them.90 Therefore police were barred from further questioning.91 The 
Oregon Supreme Court denied review, but the United States Supreme 
Court reversed, explaining that the Oregon Court of Appeals 
misapplied the Edwards test.92 
The Court explained that Edwards did not hold that initiation must 
also amount to a waiver of a previously invoked right to counsel.93 
Instead, it held only that, after a suspect invokes his right to counsel, a 
subsequent waiver can only be obtained when a suspect initiates 
conversation with police.94 It explained: 
But even if a conversation taking place after the accused has 
“expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel,” 
is initiated by the accused, where reinterrogation follows, the burden 
remains upon the prosecution to show that subsequent events 
indicated a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to have counsel 





89 Id. at 1042–43. 
90 Id. at 1044. 




95 Id. (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981)). 
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Therefore, the Court made clear that initiation by itself does not 
constitute a waiver, but police may obtain a waiver if the suspect 
initiates conversation with police.96 
As discussed in more detail below, the rule announced in Edwards 
and Bradshaw was seemingly adopted under article I, section 12, by 
the Oregon Supreme Court in Meade. However, while Butler and 
Edwards decided the question of whether the suspect waived the right 
to have counsel present in the context of a clear invocation of his rights, 
the Court in Meade was faced with a question involving waiver in the 
context of an equivocal invocation. Meade held that, in cases where the 
suspect immediately initiates conversation with police, the police are 
not required to clarify a suspect’s equivocal invocation of the right to 
counsel.97 Therefore, in some cases police may never clarify to 
suspects that they have the right to invoke Miranda rights at any time, 
while in other cases police are required to provide suspects with such 
additional information. 
II 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 12: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 
AND THE DUTY TO CLARIFY 
A. Introduction
For a long time, Oregon’s constitutional doctrine regarding the right 
against self-incrimination remained in lockstep with federal 
constitutional doctrine. However, the Oregon Supreme Court broke 
stride with the federal doctrine after the United States Supreme Court 
decided Davis v. United States. State v. Montez is the only case the 
Oregon Supreme Court decided that involved equivocal invocations 
before the United States Supreme Court decided Davis. Shortly after 
the U.S. Supreme Court decided Davis, the Oregon Supreme Court 
decided State v. Charboneau.98 Both Montez and Charboneau stand for 
the proposition that a detective is permitted under article I, section 12, 
to ask clarifying questions after a suspect equivocally invokes his or 
her rights. However, because of the historical context in which these 
cases were decided, they also likely stand for the proposition that police 
are required to follow up with clarifying questions if a suspect makes 
an equivocal request for counsel. Many federal circuits at the time had 
96 Id. 
97 State v. Meade, 327 Or. 335, 342, 963 P.2d 656, 660–61 (1998). 
98 State v. Charboneau, 323 Or. 38, 913 P.2d 308 (1996). 
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announced similar rules, so the Oregon Supreme Court’s decisions in 
those cases were unsurprising.99 
This section will discuss Davis, in which the United States Supreme 
Court definitively held that the Federal Constitution does not require 
police to clarify equivocal invocations of the right to counsel.100 After 
the United States Supreme Court decided Davis, however, Oregon 
courts maintained that article I, section 12, requires officers to clarify 
equivocal invocations.101 In Meade, the Oregon Supreme Court further 
confirmed this requirement.102 Critics of Meade suggest that Meade 
misinterpreted Montez and Charboneau when it confirmed that article 
I, section 12, requires police to clarify equivocal invocations.103 As set 
forth below, although the Oregon Supreme Court’s analysis in Meade 
was consistent with its decisions in Montez and Charboneau, the 
Supreme Court should clarify the rule going forward.104 The court in 
Meade suggested that if a suspect equivocally invokes his right against 
self-incrimination, law enforcement has a duty to clarify the suspect’s 
intent.105 The decision in Meade also correctly applied the two-step 
initiation rule announced in Edwards and Bradshaw, and therefore 
stopped short of expressly adopting an exception to the duty to clarify 
under the Oregon Constitution. 
99 See Ainsworth, supra note 9, at 301–12 (discussing the circuit split later resolved by 
Davis). 
100 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994). 
101 See Meade, 327 Or. at 342, 963 P.2d at 660–61. 
102 Id. 
103 Jacyntha Vu, Self-Incrimination—The Interrogating Officers’ Obligation to Clarify 
an Equivocal Request for Counsel May Be Obviated if the Suspect Independently Initiates 
Further Substantive Conversation Concerning the Charge Under Investigation. State v. 
Meade, 963 P.2d 656 (1998), 31 RUTGERS L.J. 1272, 1276 n.28 (2000) (“Under Charboneau 
and Montez, it would seem that the Oregon Supreme Court had followed the Davis opinion 
and decided not to require clarifying questions as well.”). 
104 It is the Oregon Department of Justice’s position that article I, section 12, does not 
require police officers to clarify equivocal invocations. See, e.g., Brief for Plaintiff-
Appellant at 34, State v. Nichols, 361 Or. 101, 390 P.3d 1001 (2017), 2016 WL 5888062, 
at *17. The Department’s position is understandable considering that the Oregon Supreme 
Court has not expressly held that such a requirement exists. Furthermore, a written opinion 
on the requirement would help provide guidance to law enforcement and lower courts in 
applying the rule. Interrogation is an adversarial proceeding and an important part of law 
enforcement’s job. Although this paper submits that there is a duty to clarify under article I, 
section 12, the Oregon Supreme Court should address the contours of that duty. For 
example, what kind of questions should police ask? Is it enough to remind a suspect that he 
or she has Miranda rights, or must police specifically ask whether a suspect is invoking 
those rights? 
105 Meade, 327 Or. at 341, 963 P.2d at 660. 
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B. State v. Montez
The Oregon Supreme Court heard Montez on direct appeal because 
cases involving the death penalty are appealable directly to the Oregon 
Supreme Court.106 In that case, Detective Goodale, a Portland 
detective, travelled to Pocatello, Idaho, to interview the defendant 
regarding a murder because the defendant had been arrested in Idaho 
on unrelated charges.107 The detective read the defendant his Miranda 
rights at the outset of the interview, and the defendant did not challenge 
the fact that he was “advised of, understood, and voluntarily waived his 
Miranda rights before talking.”108 
Instead, defendant asked the court to suppress his statements during 
the interview because the defendant claimed he invoked his rights after 
his initial waiver.109 After the detective asked the defendant a question 
about another person who may have been involved in the murder, the 
defendant replied, “I think I need a lawyer to talk about the rest of it so 
I don’t get linked up.”110 The detective then asked whether the 
defendant “was telling us that he wanted an attorney and did not want 
to talk with us anymore.”111 The defendant replied “no,” so the 
detective reminded the defendant that he had the right to have a lawyer 
present during questioning.112 The defendant stated “that was not what 
he wanted,” so the detective asked again if he was “still willing to talk 
with us.”113 The defendant replied that he would “talk to [detectives] 
without one.”114 The detectives continued questioning the defendant, 
and the defendant eventually confessed to participating in the murder, 
but did not admit to actually committing the murder himself.115 
Over the course of the next two days, the defendant agreed to 
polygraph testing.116 After the polygraph administrator told the 
defendant that the tests indicated that the defendant was being 
106 State v. Montez, 309 Or. 564, 567, 789 P.2d 1352, 1356 (1990). In Oregon, cases 
involving death penalties are appealable directly to the Oregon Supreme Court. OR. REV. 
STAT. § 138.052(1) (2017). 
107 Montez, 309 Or. at 567, 789 P.2d at 1356. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 571, 789 P.2d at 1358. 






116 Id. at 568–69, 789 P.2d at 1357. 
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untruthful, the defendant told the polygrapher that he “did not want to 
talk to him anymore.”117 The polygrapher then turned the defendant 
back over to the detectives, who resumed their questioning.118 During 
that time, the defendant still insisted that, although he had been 
involved in events surrounding the murder, it was his codefendant who 
had actually killed the victim.119 The detectives, in response to the 
defendant’s insistence that he did not commit the murder, returned the 
defendant to his cell.120 
Soon after, the defendant asked to speak again to Detective Goodale, 
and asked that Goodale “bring his tape recorder.”121 When Goodale 
arrived, he re-advised the defendant of his Miranda rights.122 It was 
during this conversation that the defendant made incriminating 
statements.123 The defendant was charged and convicted on three 
counts of aggravated murder.124 The trial court sentenced the defendant 
to death.125 
On direct appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress the statements he made to Detective 
Goodale.126 The trial court found that the defendant’s statement “I 
think I need a lawyer to talk about the rest of it so I don’t get linked up” 
was an ambiguous statement and that the detective’s following 
statements were “a reasonable inquiry whether or not [defendant] 
wanted an attorney.”127 Therefore, the trial court found that the 
defendant’s statements made during his interview with Detective 
Goodale were admissible.128 
Without much analysis, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the 
decision of the trial court. The Supreme Court agreed that the defendant 
did not “unequivocally” invoke his right to an attorney, and the 
detective’s clarifying questions were permissible because they did not 







124 Id. at 569–70, 789 P.3d at 1357–58. 
125 Id. at 571, 789 P.2d at 1358. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 572, 789 P.2d at 1359. 
128 Id. 
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“constitute further interrogation or badgering.”129 The detective’s 
“neutral questions, intended only to clarify whether and to what extent 
defendant was invoking his right to counsel, did not probe beyond that 
limited and permissible inquiry.”130 
In holding that officers were permitted to ask clarifying questions, 
the court effectively announced that it would not follow the “per se” 
approach. Under the per se approach, ambiguous or equivocal requests 
for counsel are treated like unequivocal invocations. Thus, even if a 
suspect fails to clearly articulate his desire to have an attorney present 
during questioning, as long as the request is sufficiently clear to 
constitute at least an equivocal request for counsel, interrogation must 
end.131 Under the per se approach, police are not permitted to ask 
clarifying questions.132 Therefore, by holding that police are permitted 
to ask clarifying questions when a suspect makes an equivocal 
invocation of his right to counsel, the court in Montez held that Oregon 
would not follow the per se approach. Effectively, then, the court in 
Montez appeared to follow either the clarification approach or the 
threshold of clarity approach. 
Notably, many federal courts at the time followed the clarification 
approach. In fact, at the time the court decided Montez, the Ninth 
Circuit required police to clarify ambiguous invocations.133 Of course, 
the Oregon Supreme Court is not impeded from providing less 
protection to criminal defendants than the Federal Constitution 
provides nationally.134 However, it is unlikely the Oregon Supreme 
Court would interpret the Oregon Constitution in a way that provides 
less protection to suspects than the Federal Constitution without a good 
reason for doing so. As Justice Brennan of the United States Supreme 
Court once stated: 
129 Id. (referencing Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 (1983)). 
130 Id. at 572–73, 789 P.2d at 1359. 
131 See Justice Durham’s dissent in State v. Meade, 327 Or. 335, 342–53, 963 P.2d 656, 
661–67 (1998), for a discussion of the three approaches. 
132 See People v. Traubert, 608 P.2d 342 (Colo. 1980). 
133 See, e.g., United States v. Fouche, 883 F.2d 1284, 1287 (9th Cir. 1987). 
134 State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 262, 666 P.2d 1316, 1318 (1983) (“[A]ll questions of 
state law [must] be considered and disposed of before reaching a claim that this state’s law 
falls short of a standard imposed by the Federal Constitution on all states.”). Thus, 
practically speaking, if the Oregon Constitution provided less protection than the Federal 
Constitution, and the police officer’s conduct violated the Fifth Amendment and not article 
I, section 12, Oregon courts could reverse a conviction on federal grounds, rather than 
heightening Oregon constitutional protections to meet United States Supreme Court 
standards. 
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[S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the
full protections of the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too,
are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending
beyond those required by the Supreme Court’s interpretations of
federal law. The legal revolution which has brought federal law to
the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective
force of state law — for without it, the full realization of our liberties
cannot be guaranteed.135
That sentiment was echoed by Justice Hans Linde of the Oregon 
Supreme Court, explaining, “State courts are returning to their state 
charters to deal with issues that for forty years they left to be debated 
and resolved by the national Supreme Court. The question in the state 
courts no longer is whether to give independent attention to state 
constitutional issues, but how.”136 
Justice Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court further summed up the 
relationship between state constitutions and the Federal Constitution by 
noting: 
Of course we pay attention and respect to Supreme Court opinions 
on issues common to the two constitutions, and it is to be expected 
that on many such issues courts will reach common answers. The 
crucial step for counsel and for state courts, however, is to recognize 
that the Supreme Court’s answer is not presumptively the right 
answer, to be followed unless the state court explains why not. The 
right question is not whether a state’s guarantee is the same as or 
broader than its federal counterpart as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court. The right question is what the state’s guarantee means and 
how it applies to the case at hand. The answer may turn out the same 
as it would under federal law. The state’s law may prove to be more 
protective than federal law. The state law also may be less protective. 
In that case the court must go on to decide the claim under federal 
law, assuming it has been raised.137 
Situations where state constitutions provide less protection than the 
Federal Constitution create more complicated cases for state courts. In 
Oregon, when a party raises constitutional issues on appeal, the Oregon 
Supreme Court analyzes the issue first under the Oregon Constitution 
before turning to the Federal Constitution.138 As a practical matter, 
135 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 
90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977). 
136 Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus—Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 
165, 166 (1984). 
137 Id. at 179. 
138 See, e.g., Kennedy, 295 Or. at 262, 666 P.2d at 1318; State v. Soriano, 68 Or. App. 
642, 645, 684 P.3d 1220, 1222 (1984) (en banc) (“While many guarantees of the state and 
federal constitutions have their roots in the same sources, they are embodied in different 
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providing criminal suspects less constitutional protection under article 
I, section 12, than the Federal Constitution provides under the Fifth 
Amendment creates much more work for the Oregon Supreme Court. 
In every appeal, Oregon courts would be required to analyze the issue 
under state law, find that it does not protect the suspect, and then fully 
analyze the issue again under federal law to determine whether the 
suspect is protected under the Federal Constitution. 
Additionally, when a criminal defendant raises only a state 
constitutional claim on appeal, but is protected only under the Federal 
Constitution (and not protected under the state constitution), courts 
have three options. First, courts can deny relief under the state 
constitution and decline to analyze the issue under the Federal 
Constitution because the defendant failed to raise the federal issue on 
appeal. Assuming the right is incorporated, however, such a course of 
action may violate the defendant’s federal constitutional rights.139 
Second, courts may be in a position where they must grant a criminal 
defendant relief under the Federal Constitution even if the defendant 
never raises the issue.140 Or—the third option—the state court could 
avoid the problem altogether and treat the federal constitutional 
protections as a floor for its state constitutional doctrine. It is no 
wonder, then, why state courts usually choose the third option and 
provide at least the same amount of protection to criminal defendants 
under state constitutions as provided under the Federal Constitution.141 
Therefore, the Oregon Supreme Court needs a specific (and likely 
compelling) reason to provide less protection for criminal defendants 
under the Oregon Constitution than is provided under the Federal 
Constitution. Finding a specific and compelling reason may be 
difficult, as Davis is a widely criticized opinion. Many Fifth 
Amendment scholars believe that the “threshold of clarity” approach 
constitutions, with different ultimate interpreters, and may reflect variations in their values 
and purposes.”). 
139 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. L. REV. 503, 522 (1985) 
(“[A] state denies and deprives rights and equality if it . . . denies redress for violations.”). 
Of course if the court chose option two, a criminal defendant could raise the issue in a post-
conviction proceeding. However, that is not as efficient as option number three. 
140 See generally Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 614, 625 P.2d 123, 126 (1981); Kennedy, 
295 Or. at 262, 666 P.2d at 1318 (discussing the relationship between the Oregon 
Constitution and the Federal Constitution). 
141 See Brennan, supra note 135, at 495 (“Of late, however, more and more state courts 
are construing state constitutional counterparts of the provisions of the Bill of Rights as 
guaranteeing citizens of their states even more protection than the federal provisions, even 
those identically phrased.”). 
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established by Davis, which allows police to ignore equivocal 
invocations of the right to counsel, is inconsistent with Miranda 
itself.142 Miranda specified that a suspect was free to invoke his rights 
“in any manner.”143 The threshold of clarity approach seems 
inconsistent with that phrasing—after Davis, suspects may not invoke 
“in any manner”; rather, they must invoke only in a clear manner. 
Additionally, a survey of invocation cases since Davis found that 
there is evidence showing women and minorities have a difficult time 
invoking their rights.144 Many others have echoed similar concerns.145 
Overall, Strauss found “there is clear evidence to support the 
proposition that women, minorities, and Caucasian males fail to 
demand an attorney in declarative, clear language. Instead, the use of 
questions, hedges, and imprecise language in the custodial 
interrogation setting is very common among all suspects of any race or 
gender.”146 Although the threshold of clarity approach may make it 
easier for police to attain confessions, that is not a compelling reason 
to follow the federal rule. The ease of eliciting confessions is 
accomplished by making it more difficult for criminal suspects to 
invoke their rights—particularly if the suspect is a woman or minority. 
Considering that it is likely that the Oregon Supreme Court in 
Montez was operating under the assumption that the Federal 
Constitution may require officers to clarify ambiguous invocations, 
there is a small chance the court provided less protection than the 
clarification approach. Additionally, since Montez and Charboneau 
(discussed below), almost all Oregon appellate decisions regarding the 
issue have assumed, based on the permissive language in those cases, 
that article I, section 12, requires police to clarify equivocal 
142 See Strauss, supra note 36, at 1012 n.10 (collecting criticisms of Davis v. United 
States); C. Antoinette Clarke, Say It Loud: Indirect Speech and Racial Equality in the 
Interrogation Room, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 813, 820–21 (1999); Floralynn 
Einesman, Confessions and Culture: The Interaction of Miranda and Diversity, 90 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 32–33 (1999); Tom Chen, Note, Davis v. United States: “Maybe I
Should Talk to a Lawyer” Means Maybe Miranda is Unraveling, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 607, 643
(1996); Samira Sadeghi, Comment, Hung Up on Semantics: A Critique of Davis v. United
States, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 313, 330 (1995); Alexa Young, Note, When is a Request
a Request?: Inadequate Constitutional Protection for Women in Police Interrogations, 51
FLA. L. REV. 143, 144 (1999)).
143 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966). 
144 Strauss, supra note 36. 
145 See Strauss, supra note 17, at 764 (discussing criticism of Davis). 
146 Strauss, supra note 36, at 1057. 
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invocations.147 While the court may have failed to clearly announce the 
rule, Oregon appellate courts seem to be operating under the 
assumption that article I, section 12, requires police officers to ask 
clarifying questions after a suspect equivocally invokes the right to 
counsel during interrogation. 
C. Davis v. United States
After the Oregon Supreme Court decided Montez, the Supreme 
Court weighed in on the issue in Davis.148 There, the defendant, a 
member of the United States Navy, was charged and convicted of 
unpremeditated murder.149 During an interrogation conducted by 
Naval Investigative Service (NIS) agents, the defendant stated, 
“[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer.”150 The NIS agents testified that, in 
response to defendant’s statement about a lawyer: 
We made it very clear that we’re not here to violate his rights, that if 
he wants a lawyer, then we will stop any kind of questioning with 
him, that we weren’t going to pursue the matter unless we have it 
clarified is he asking for a lawyer or is he just making a comment 
about a lawyer . . . .151 
The defendant then told the NIS agents that he was not asking for a 
lawyer and that he did not want a lawyer, after which the interview 
continued for another hour.152 
The defendant appealed his conviction to the United States Military 
Court of Appeals, claiming that statements made during his 
interrogation were obtained in violation of Miranda because his 
statement “[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer” was an invocation, and 
thus the detectives were required to end questioning.153 The Court of 
Appeals disagreed, and found that the defendant’s request for counsel 
was ambiguous and that the NIS agents properly clarified whether the 
defendant actually wished to invoke his rights.154 The court also noted 
147 See, e.g., State v. Avila-Nava, 356 Or. 600, 341 P.3d 714 (2014); State v. Hudson, 
253 Or. App. 327, 290 P.3d 868 (2012); State v. Field, 231 Or. App. 115, 218 P.3d 551 
(2009); State v. Holcomb, 213 Or. App. 168, 159 P.3d 1271 (2007). 
148 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994). 
149 Id. at 454–55. 
150 Id. at 455. 
151 Id. (alterations omitted). 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 456. 
154 Id. 
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the different approaches that jurisdictions use when dealing with a 
suspect’s equivocal request for counsel. 
Some jurisdictions have held that any mention of counsel, however 
ambiguous, is sufficient to require that all questioning cease. Others 
have attempted to define a threshold standard of clarity for invoking 
the right to counsel and have held that comments falling short of the 
threshold do not invoke the right to counsel. Some jurisdictions, 
including several federal circuits, have held that all interrogation 
about the offense must immediately cease whenever a suspect 
mentions counsel, but they allow interrogators to ask narrow 
questions designed to clarify the earlier statement and the accused’s 
desires respecting counsel.155 
Notably, the Military Court of Appeals had previously addressed the 
issue of whether police were permitted to ask clarifying questions after 
an ambiguous invocation and held that clarifying questions were in fact 
permitted.156 Thus, when faced with the issue again in Davis, the Court 
of Military Appeals found that the defendant’s statements were 
admissible because the officers properly clarified the defendant’s 
ambiguous request for counsel, and thus the court determined that the 
defendant was not, in fact, invoking his right against self-
incrimination.157 
The United States Supreme Court affirmed.158 Justice O’Connor 
wrote the majority opinion and was joined by four other Justices.159 
The Court held that the defendant’s statement “[m]aybe I should talk 
to a lawyer” was not a clear request for counsel.160 However, the Court 
did not analyze the issue any further. Instead, the Court held that, 
although it may be “good police practice” to clarify ambiguous 
statements to determine whether the suspect actually wants an attorney, 
police are not required to do so.161 Instead, if a suspect’s statement is 
not a clear request for counsel, police officers have no obligation to end 
155 United States v. Davis, 36 M.J. 337, 341 (C.M.A 1993) (internal quotations omitted) 
(citing Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 96 n.3 (1984) (compiling cases showing different 
approaches taken by various jurisdictions)). Before Davis, the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh 
Circuits had explicitly adopted the “clarification approach.” See United States v. Mendoza-
Cecelia, 963 F.2d 1467, 1472 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Fouche, 833 F.2d 1284, 
1287 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Cherry, 733 F.2d 1124, 1130 (5th Cir. 1984). 
156 United States v. Sager, 36 M.J. 137, 145 (C.M.A. 1992). 
157 Davis, 36 M.J. at 342. 
158 Davis, 512 U.S. at 462. 
159 Id. at 453. 
160 Id. at 462. 
161 Id. at 461. 
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interrogation.162 Therefore, the defendant’s statements that he made to 
the police after he equivocally invoked his right to counsel were 
admissible at trial.163 
D. State v. Charboneau
Shortly after the United States Supreme Court decided Davis, the 
Oregon Supreme Court decided Charboneau.164 The court answered 
the same question as it did in Montez: Were the defendant’s 
statements—made after he equivocally invoked his right to counsel and 
after the detectives asked clarifying questions—admissible? In 
Charboneau, the defendant asked a detective if he would “have the 
opportunity to call an attorney tonight.”165 In response, the detectives 
attempted to clarify whether the defendant wished to continue 
questioning.166 They asked the defendant, “What do you want to do? 
Do you want to call or what? What option do you want to complete 
with regard to that?”167 The defendant responded that he was willing 
to continue interrogation.168 
The defendant argued that his statement was an unequivocal request 
for counsel and that any further questioning by the detectives violated 
his article I, section 12, constitutional rights.169 The Oregon Supreme 
Court disagreed.170 Instead, the court explained that “[i]n the totality 
of the circumstances, defendant’s question simply does not constitute, 
as a matter of law, an unequivocal request for a lawyer.”171 Instead, the 
court agreed with the trial court’s finding that the defendant’s statement 
was “at most, an equivocal request.”172 After the defendant equivocally 
requested an attorney, the detective asked the defendant clarifying 
questions, intending to determine whether the defendant wanted to 
speak with a lawyer before continuing interrogation.173 Therefore, 
162 Id. at 461–62. 
163 Id. at 462. 
164 State v. Charboneau, 323 Or. 38, 913 P.2d 308 (1996). 




169 Id. at 54, 913 P.2d at 317. 
170 Id. at 55, 913 P.2d at 318. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 55–56, 913 P.2d at 318. Based on the court’s reasoning, “neutral questions” 
likely means questions “directed only to whether defendant intended to invoke his right to 
counsel.” Id. at 56. 
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citing Montez, the court held that the detective’s questions “did not 
probe beyond that limited and permissible inquiry.”174 Thus, the 
defendant’s article I, section 12, rights were not violated.175 
The court in both Montez and Charboneau narrowly addressed the 
issue before it, but in doing so did not foreclose upon the possibility 
that police are required to clarify whether a suspect intended to invoke 
his rights after uttering an ambiguous statement regarding a lawyer. In 
both cases, the court was presented with a situation in which a detective 
asked clarifying questions after a suspect made an equivocal request 
for counsel. Thus, the question was whether a law enforcement officer 
is permitted to ask clarifying questions. Answering that question in the 
affirmative, the court foreclosed on the possibility that Oregon would 
follow the per se approach. That is so because the per se approach treats 
even equivocal references to counsel as per se invocations, so officers 
are not permitted to ask even clarifying questions.176 
Furthermore, since the time Charboneau and Montez were decided, 
the Oregon Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have suggested in 
dictum that article I, section 12, not only permits but also requires 
officers to clarify ambiguous invocations.177 In doing so, Oregon 
courts recognize the difficulty in invoking Miranda rights. As Justice 
Linde wrote, the right question is “what the state’s guarantee means 
and how it applies to the case at hand.”178 Considering that the duty to 
clarify is likely the rule in Oregon, the question is what does that 
guarantee mean and how should it be applied in cases where the suspect 
reinitiates conversation with police after equivocally invoking the right 
to counsel? The Oregon Supreme Court partly answered that question 
in State v. Meade, discussed below. 
174 Id. at 56, 913 P.2d at 318 (quoting State v. Montez, 309 Or. 564, 572–73, 789 P.2d 
1352, 1359 (1990)). 
175 Id. at 58, 913 P.2d at 320. 
176 State v. Meade, 327 Or. 335, 347, 963 P.2d 656, 663 (1998) (Durham, J., dissenting). 
177 See, e.g., State v. Nichols, 361 Or. 101, 106 n.3, 390 P.3d 1001, 1005 n.3 (2017) 
(noting that Meade suggested the duty to clarify exists under article I, section 12) ; State v. 
McAnulty, 356 Or. 432, 456–57, 338 P.3d 653, 670 (2014); State v. Sanelle, 287 Or. App. 
611, 617, 404 P.3d 992, 996–97 (2017); State v. Alarcon, 259 Or. App. 462, 468, 314 P.3d 
364, 368–69 (2013). 
178 Linde, supra note 136, at 179. 
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III 
A SECOND LOOK AT STATE V. MEADE 
A. Exception to the Duty to Clarify
Meade was a criminal case where the defendant was charged with 
sodomy and sexual abuse.179 Before his arrest, the defendant was 
traveling internationally. When the defendant arrived back in Portland, 
two police detectives greeted him at the airport and escorted him to the 
police station.180 Once there, the detectives read the defendant his 
Miranda rights and told him that the purpose of the interview was to 
investigate allegations that he had sexually abused his girlfriend’s 
daughter.181 
After questioning the defendant for about an hour, the defendant 
stated that “if he needed a lawyer, he wanted one.”182 The detectives 
paused their questioning, but before they had the opportunity to say 
anything further, the defendant put his hands up as if to indicate that he 
wished for the detectives to refrain from speaking and said, “You’ve 
talked a lot. I want to say a few things.”183 The defendant continued 
talking about his relationship with his girlfriend and told the detectives 
that it seemed as though they wanted him to confess to something that 
he did not do.184 One officer then stated, “No, I don’t want you to 
confess to something that you didn’t do, but I have this investigation 
and I believe you did it.”185 The detectives resumed questioning, 
eliciting several incriminating statements from the defendant.186 
Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress statements he made 
during interrogation that he claimed were obtained in violation of his 
article I, section 12, right against self-incrimination.187 The trial court 
granted the defendant’s motion, finding that the defendant’s statement 
that “if he needed a lawyer, he wanted one” was an equivocal request 
for counsel and that the police were then required to limit their 
questioning to clarifying questions to determine whether the defendant 





184 Id. at 337–38, 963 P.2d at 658. 
185 Id. at 338, 963 P.2d at 658. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
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invoked his article I, section 12, rights.188 The state appealed the trial 
court’s decision.189 The Court of Appeals reversed, and the Oregon 
Supreme Court affirmed.190 
In affirming, the court assumed that the trial court correctly 
concluded that the defendant’s statement about a lawyer was an 
equivocal request for counsel.191 The State argued that the defendant 
waived his right to counsel by putting up his hands and stating, “You’ve 
talked a lot. I want to say a few things.”192 The issue, then, was whether 
“the interrogating officers’ obligation, discussed in [Montez and 
Charboneau], to clarify an equivocal invocation of the right to counsel 
be obviated, if the suspect thereafter, and without prompting from the 
officers, initiates further substantive conversation concerning the 
charge under investigation.”193 By phrasing the issue in such a way, 
the court in Meade made clear that Oregon would not adopt the 
approach followed by federal courts after Davis—the “threshold of 
clarity” approach—and acknowledged that under Montez and 
Charboneau, police officers have a duty to clarify equivocal references 
to counsel.194 
In Meade, the suspect’s own actions eliminated the need for 
clarification because the statements he made after referencing counsel 
focused on the substance of the charges against him.195 Thus, the court 
in Meade both reaffirmed that article I, section 12, requires police to 
clarify equivocal invocations and, as discussed below, announced an 
exception to that rule. While the exception is not incorrect, it brings to 
light problems with the current approach to clarification. Taking a 
second look back at Meade, Oregon courts must now consider what the 
constitutional requirement of clarification means in cases going 
forward. 
The majority in Meade found that it did not matter whether the 
suspect invoked his rights because his subsequent actions indicated a 
“willingness and desire” to continue, which constituted an initiation of 
conversation with police.196 The court in Meade then moved on to the 
188 Id. at 338, 963 P.2d 658–59. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 338–39, 963 P.2d at 659. 
191 Id. at 339, 963 P.2d at 659. 
192 Id. at 339–40, 963 P.2d at 659. 
193 Id. at 340, 963 P.2d at 659. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 341, 963 P.2d at 660. 
196 Id. 
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second step of the analysis laid out in Edwards and Bradshaw and 
asked whether the suspect’s waiver was knowing and voluntary.197 In 
deciding whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his 
right to counsel, the court considered that the defendant 
is highly educated, having earned a doctorate degree in psychology; 
defendant was advised of his Miranda rights at the beginning of the 
interview, waived them immediately, and engaged in a lengthy, 
substantive discussion with the detectives about the case; the trial 
court found that defendant understood his rights when he waived 
them initially, that he was alert throughout the interview, and that his 
statements before the equivocal request for counsel were the result of 
free, unconstrained, and informed choice; and, finally, the period 
between the time when defendant equivocally invoked his rights and 
then initiated substantive discussion was very short. Nothing 
occurred during that period that reasonably could have altered 
defendant’s understanding of his rights.198 
However, something did occur during the period between the 
defendant’s initial waiver and his equivocal invocation—the defendant 
indicated that he wanted a lawyer. 
The majority opinion in Meade prompted a dissent. However, the 
dissent in Meade agreed with the majority’s conclusion that if a suspect 
reinitiates conversation with police after making an ambiguous 
reference to counsel, the police may obtain a waiver and continue 
interrogation.199 Instead, the dissent simply found that, under the facts 
presented in Meade, the suspect’s actions did not sufficiently constitute 
a waiver.200 
Thus, both the majority and the dissent in Meade came to the same 
conclusion—in some situations, the duty to clarify may be obviated if 
a suspect initiates further conversation with police.201 Such a holding 
brings to light a problem in Oregon’s law—some suspects who 
equivocally invoke will receive the benefits of clarification and some 
will not. The difficulty with such a conclusion is that Oregon courts 
recognize that it is difficult for a suspect to clearly invoke Miranda 
rights, which is part of the reason why clarification is required in the 
197 Id. (“Having concluded that defendant initiated the conversation with detectives, we 
turn to the remaining issue, viz., whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary under the 
totality of the circumstances.”) 
198 Id. at 341–42, 963 P.2d at 660 (internal citation omitted). 
199 See State v. Boyd, 360 Or. 302, 313, 380 P.3d 941, 947–48 (2016) (discussing 
Meade). Boyd made clear that the court in Meade relied on Bradshaw and Edwards in its 
“particular formulation of the test.” Id. at 313, 380 P.3d at 948. 
200 Meade, 327 Or. at 353, 963 P.2d at 666–67. 
201 Id. at 341 n.4, 963 P.2d at 660 n.4. 
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first place. Thus, every suspect should receive the benefits of 
clarification, not just those suspects who do not reinitiate conversation 
with police. 
Justice Durham, in his dissent, noted that the duty to clarify was 
“rooted in common sense.”202 He explained that the duty to clarify 
serves two purposes.203 First, it helps determine whether, by 
equivocally invoking his right to counsel, a suspect “actually intended 
to exercise his personal right to seek legal advice before proceeding 
with the interview.”204 Similarly, a second purpose of the duty to 
clarify “is that it relieves police officers of the difficult burden of 
guessing whether a suspect’s statement was an unequivocal or merely 
ambiguous invocation and, thus, protects the admissibility of 
subsequent incriminating statements should the suspect choose to make 
them.”205 
A third purpose (or rather, effect) of clarifying equivocal invocations 
was not mentioned in Meade. The third purpose of clarifying questions 
is to help inform suspects of their rights. Justice Durham noted, “In the 
face of an ambiguous invocation, asking a clarifying question provides 
assurance that the ‘right to choose between speech and silence remains 
unfettered throughout the interrogation process.’”206 Not only does 
clarification provide the courts with assurance that a confession was 
obtained voluntarily, clarification also provides the suspect with 
assurance that their rights will be honored. In other words, if police 
clarify whether a suspect wishes to invoke his right to have counsel 
present during interrogation, it serves the purpose of reminding the 
suspect that he has such a right in the first place. 
The purposes of clarification matter in every case. Thus, even if the 
suspect reinitiates after an equivocal invocation, the need to clarify the 
suspect’s invocation still matters. As discussed below, police should be 
required to clarify how to invoke Miranda rights at the outset of 
interrogation, so that even if the duty to clarify again is obviated, the 
suspect may have a better understanding of their rights in the first place. 
In other words, the Miranda warnings themselves should contain 
clarifying language explaining to suspects how to invoke their rights. 
202 Id. at 349, 963 P.2d at 665. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. at 349–50, 963 P.2d at 665. 
206 Id. at 349 (quoting Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987)) (emphasis in 
original). 
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B. New Clarification Rule
The purpose of clarification is better served if the warnings 
themselves clarify to the suspect how to invoke his or her Miranda 
rights. Coincidentally, the purpose of the Miranda warnings is 
markedly similar to the purpose of clarification. The purpose of the 
Miranda warnings is to inform suspects of their rights during 
questioning by the police and to help protect suspects from the 
“inherently coercive” environment of interrogations.207 To determine 
whether the warnings given to suspects at the outset of interrogation 
are adequate, the legal test the Supreme Court developed is whether the 
warning “reasonably convey[s]” to the defendant his rights.208 Oregon 
employs a similar standard—warnings are adequate if they “accurately 
and effectively” convey the substance of the suspect’s rights.209 
However, while every jurisdiction requires that suspects must be 
informed of what their rights are, no jurisdiction currently requires 
police to inform suspects how to invoke their rights.210 In fact, “there 
is little reason to believe police—who have ample incentives to avoid 
invocation” will provide suspects with guidance on how to invoke their 
rights if police are not required to do so.211 
Furthermore, criminal defense lawyers have found that 
many suspects make statements during the process of police 
interrogation and are surprised to learn thereafter that they had a 
constitutional right to remain silent or have an attorney present during 
questioning. This pattern suggests that Miranda warnings as 
currently delivered by the police are not an effective means of 
informing suspects [of their rights] . . . . [N]otwithstanding the 
warnings, they believed either that their silence could be used against 
them as evidence of guilt or, more frequently, that by remaining silent 
they would forfeit their opportunity to be released on bail.212 
207 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 533–34 (1966) (White, J., dissenting); see also id. at 
458 (majority opinion) (“Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the 
compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant 
can truly be the product of his free choice.”). 
208 David B. Altman, Fifth Amendment—Coercion and Clarity: The Supreme Court 
Approves Altered Miranda Warnings, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 1086, 1103 (1990) 
(discussing Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989)). 
209 State v. Vondehn, 348 Or. 462, 481, 236 P.3d 691, 703 (2010). 
210 See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 409–10 (2010) (Sotomayor, J. dissenting) 
(“[T]he Miranda warnings give no hint that a suspect should use those magic words . . . .”). 
211 Id. at 410. 
212 Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to 
Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1827–28 (1987). 
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Others have suggested that the warnings actually encourage suspects 
to talk to police.213 They claim that “[t]he warnings implicitly suggest 
to the suspect that the police are not only law-abiding, but that they are 
also fair and objective. If delivered in the proper tone, the warnings 
could even suggest to the suspect that the investigators are sympathetic, 
naive, or gullible.”214 A skilled investigator could easily adjust her tone 
to minimize the significance of the warnings. For example, the police 
could tell the suspect that they are “required” to give the warnings—
implying that the particular suspect need not worry too much about 
them. In fact, there is nothing preventing police from doing so because 
it is true that police are required to read suspects their rights.  
Thus, it is unsurprising that studies find that about eighty percent of 
suspects waive their rights after hearing Miranda warnings, despite the 
fact that it is typically not in their best interest to do so.215 
It is also unsurprising that most suspects waive their rights given that 
the warnings themselves are confusing. A study analyzing the Flesch-
Kincaid readability grade level of the standardized Miranda warnings 
given by Milwaukee police found that the warnings were difficult to 
fully understand.216 The standardized warnings in Milwaukee include 
five separate parts: 
1. You have the right to remain silent.
2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of
law.
3. You have the right to consult with a lawyer before questioning
and to have a lawyer present with you during questioning.
213 Steven B. Duke, Does Miranda Protect the Innocent or Guilty?, 10 CHAPMAN L. 
REV. 551, 558–60 (2007); Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the 
Twenty-Frist Century, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1003 (2001) (“[D]espite the fourfold warn-
ings, suspects frequently waived their Miranda rights and chose, instead, to speak to their 
interrogators. Some researchers attributed this largely unexpected finding to the manner in 
which the detectives delivered the Miranda warnings, while others attributed it to the fail-
ure of suspects to understand the meaning or significance of their Miranda rights.”). 
214 Duke, supra note 213, at 558. 
215 Anthony J. Domanico et al., Overcoming Miranda: A Content Analysis of the 
Miranda Portion of Police Interrogations, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 13 (2012) (discussing studies 
by Paul Softley, Richard A. Leo, Paul G. Cassell, and Bret S. Hayman, which found that 
80% of suspects waive their rights). In a different study, Domanico found that twenty-seven 
of twenty-nine suspects waived their Miranda rights. Id. 
216 Id. at 14 (“Given its Flesch-Kincaid readability scores, we can say with confidence 
that the Miranda warning used in Milwaukee is difficult to understand fully . . . .”). 
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4. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to
represent you at public expense before or during any questioning,
if you so wish.
5. If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present,
you have the right to stop the questioning and remain silent at any
time you wish, and the right to ask for and have a lawyer at any
time you wish, including during the questioning.217
The study found that the first part of the warnings is easiest to 
understand—the Flesch-Kincaid readability score indicated that most 
second-graders would be able to understand that they have the right to 
remain silent.218 The second part requires a reading level of 4.4, or that 
of most fourth graders.219 From there, the warnings become much more 
difficult to understand. Part three and four require a reading level of 
10.0 and 13.0.220 Significantly, part five, which informs suspects that 
they may invoke their rights even after an initial waiver, was the most 
difficult to understand. Part five received a score of 18.7—meaning that 
in order to understand that a suspect is allowed to invoke his or her 
rights requires a reading comprehension level that some college 
students may not have.221 
The Milwaukee warnings are better than others. In Oregon, for 
example, the warnings must “accurately and effectively” convey the 
information necessary to allow a suspect to knowingly and voluntarily 
waive his rights.222 In one case, the officer told the suspect: 
It’s my duty as a police officer to advise you of your rights. You have 
the right to remain silent, anything you say can and will be used 
against you in a court of law. You have the right to an attorney. If 
you can’t afford to hire an attorney, one will be appointed to represent 
you. If you do give a statement at any time, you can stop at any time 
you wish. Do you understand these rights?223 
Even though the above warnings do not contain any information 
informing the suspect that he may invoke his right to an attorney at any 
time during questioning, the Oregon Court of Appeals found that the 






222 State v. Vondehn, 348 Or. 462, 481, 236 P.3d 691, 703 (2010). 
223 State v. Quinn, 112 Or. App. 608, 610–11, 831 P.2d 48, 50 (1992). 
224 Id. at 616, 831 P.2d at 53. 
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The Milwaukee standard warnings analyzed in this study include 
more information than is constitutionally necessary in Oregon, but even 
the Milwaukee warnings tell the suspect only of the substance of his 
rights. In other words, the Milwaukee warnings fail to inform the 
suspect of how, exactly, to assert his rights. Thus, it is no surprise that 
the same study that showed eighty percent of suspects waive their rights 
at the outset of interrogation also showed that “almost no suspects 
[invoke] their rights after a valid waiver.”225 Additionally, suspects 
who are “better-educated and more affluent” may “have a clearer 
understanding of their rights” and therefore “will be inclined to assert 
them more directly.”226 Suspects who are familiar with the criminal 
justice process, perhaps because they have already been through the 
system, may also have a better understanding of their rights and 
therefore be better able to invoke them after an initial waiver.227 
The Supreme Court recognized in Berghuis that a suspect who 
knows that he may invoke his rights at any time “has the opportunity 
to reassess his . . . immediate and long-term interests.”228 It is therefore 
important that a suspect knows he can initially waive his rights but then 
later on can change his mind and invoke them. The Oregon Supreme 
Court, in interpreting article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution, 
has decided that requiring officers to clarify equivocal invocations is 
the best way to protect that right. However, after Meade, not every 
suspect will benefit from the duty to clarify. 
C. The Solution: “Mirandizing” Article I, Section 12
Every criminal suspect should have the opportunity to benefit from 
clarification under article I, section 12. Meade shows that is not the 
case. Take, for instance, the fact that Oregon courts treat some 
questions regarding a suspect’s right to counsel as equivocal 
invocations. In Charboneau, for example, the court held that police 
were permitted to continue interrogation even though the suspect 
asked, “Will I have an opportunity to call an attorney tonight?”229 
225 Strauss, supra note 17, at 774. 
226 LAWRENCE M. SOLAN & PETER M. TIERSMA, SPEAKING OF CRIME: THE LANGUAGE 
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 60 (2005). 
227 Strauss, supra note 17, at 806. 
228 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 388 (2010). 
229 Compare State v. Charboneau, 323 Or. 38, 52, 55, 913 P.2d 308, 316, 318 (1996) 
(holding that the suspect’s question, “Will I have an opportunity to call an attorney tonight?” 
was an equivocal invocation), with State v. Dahlen, 209 Or. App. 110, 117–18, 146 P.3d 
359, 364 (2006) (finding the defendant’s statement, “When can I call an attorney?” was an 
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Similarly, in State v. Sanelle, the suspect asked “Where’s the lawyer?” 
immediately after police read him his Miranda rights.230 The court in 
Sanelle found that the suspect’s question was an equivocal invocation 
of the suspect’s rights.231 However, unlike the suspect’s statements in 
Charboneau, the suspect’s statements in Sanelle were suppressed. The 
different result in Sanelle appeared to turn on the fact that the suspect 
in that case did not reinitiate conversation with police. However, the 
court in Sanelle was likely reluctant to apply the rule announced in 
Meade to the case because the suspect’s question indicated that the 
suspect likely did not understand the Miranda warnings in the first 
place. 
Under the rule announced in Meade, if the suspect in Sanelle had 
initiated conversation with police, the police would have had no duty 
to ask clarifying questions. The suspect, even though he asked a 
question about his rights, would not have been entitled to any of the 
assurances contemplated by the dissent in Meade reminding him that 
he had the right to counsel during interrogation. 
In Sanelle, immediately after the officers read the suspect his 
Miranda warnings, the suspect asked, “Where’s the lawyer?”232 The 
detective answered the question by saying that the suspect had not yet 
retained a lawyer and informed him that “he would receive court-
appointed counsel in two days at defendant’s arraignment hearing.”233 
Then the detectives asked if the suspect was willing to talk to the 
detectives.234 The suspect responded, “Yes, absolutely” and the 
officers began the interrogation.235 
Even though the suspect’s question “Where’s the lawyer?” came in 
response to hearing his Miranda rights and before the officers obtained 
a waiver, the Oregon Court of Appeals held that the statement was an 
equivocal invocation of the suspect’s article I, section 12, rights.236 
And, because the suspect made an equivocal invocation, under article 
unequivocal invocation). Thus, a question by a suspect asking about the nature of the rights 
themselves, such as in Charboneau, is an equivocal invocation, whereas a question 
indicating a “present desire to do something” indicates that a suspect unequivocally is 
invoking his rights. Dahlen, 209 Or. App. at 118, 146 P.3d at 364. 
230 State v. Sanelle, 287 Or. App. 611, 625, 404 P.3d 992, 1001 (2017), review denied, 
362 Or. 482, 412 P.3d 199 (2018). 
231 Id. 
232 Id. at 613, 404 P.3d at 994. 
233 Id. at 627, 404 P.3d at 1002. 
234 Id. at 614, 404 P.3d at 995. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. at 625–26, 404 P.3d at 1001. 
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I, section 12, the officers were required to clarify the suspect’s 
statement.237 However, the detective’s response to “where’s the 
lawyer”—that the defendant had yet to retain counsel and that he would 
get one at arraignment—did not satisfy the clarification requirement.238 
The court reasoned that the detective’s response clarified the 
defendant’s right to court-appointed counsel under article I, section 11, 
of the Oregon Constitution.239 Of course, the right to counsel under 
article I, section 11, is different from the right to counsel under section 
12. A suspect’s right to counsel under article I, section 11, only
guarantees the right to an attorney at trial and during preparation for
trial after formal charges have been made.240 Here, the state had not yet
charged the defendant, so only his right against self-incrimination
under article I, section 12, applied.241 Because the officer answered the
suspect’s question regarding his rights under article I, section 11, it may
have misled the suspect into believing he did not have the right to an
attorney during questioning.242
At first glance, the court’s holding in Sanelle seems odd. The 
detective’s response to the suspect’s question was, after all, a truthful 
answer to the suspect’s question. However, conflating the two rights 
may also have misled the suspect into thinking that he did not have the 
right to end interrogation until the officers provided him with an 
attorney. Therefore, the court’s holding in Sanelle could mean that a 
true statement regarding a closely related, yet different, right was 
enough to mislead the suspect so that there could no longer be a 
presumption that he understood the warnings.  
Furthermore, if the officer in Sanelle had instead asked a clarifying 
question, the question may have confused the suspect even further. As 
the Oregon Supreme Court explained in Meade, to clarify whether a 
suspect intended to invoke his Miranda rights, an interrogating officer 
may only ask “neutral questions . . . directed solely at determining 
whether the suspect was or was not invoking the right to counsel.”243 
237 Id. at 627, 404 P.3d at 1002. 
238 Id. at 627, 404 P.3d at 1002. 
239 Id. at 628, 404 P.3d at 1002. Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution states: 
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to public trial by an impartial 
jury in the county in which the offense shall have been committed; to be heard by himself 
and counsel . . . .”  
240 State v. Davis, 350 Or. 440, 472, 256 P.3d 1075, 1093 (2011). 
241 Sanelle, 287 Or. App. at 627–28, 404 P.3d at 1002. 
242 Id. at 628, 404 P.3d at 1002. 
243 State v. Meade, 327 Or. 335, 340, 963 P.2d 656, 659 (1998). 
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Asking a suspect whether he or she intended to invoke the right to 
counsel may be a useless endeavor if the suspect does not understand 
what that right means. 
At the same time, there may be situations where an officer’s failure 
to clarify an equivocal invocation confuses the suspect. Failing to 
clarify a suspect’s attempt at invoking his right to counsel may lead the 
suspect to believe that he cannot invoke the right during interrogation. 
And, after Meade, the chances of such a situation occurring are real.244 
To avoid this problem, the Oregon Supreme Court should require that 
officers inform suspects how to invoke their rights as part of the 
warnings themselves. Adding clarifying language to the current 
warnings ensures every suspect will benefit from the duty to clarify, 
avoiding the problem created by the exception to the duty set forth in 
Meade. 
The Oregon Supreme Court has been asked to improve on the 
warnings before, but it has declined to do so.245 In State v. Sparklin, 
the court declined to add language to the current warnings because “the 
convenience of a single text exceeds any gain from improving that 
text.”246 At the time Sparklin was decided, however, the Oregon 
Supreme Court had not yet decided whether article I, section 12, 
required warnings at all. In fact, three years after Sparklin was decided, 
the Oregon Supreme Court noted in a plurality opinion that article I, 
section 12, did not require warnings.247 In subsequent cases, the 
Oregon Supreme Court seemingly backtracked the plurality opinion in 
Smith.248 Eventually, the Oregon Supreme Court decided that article I, 
section 12, provides an independent basis for providing warnings.249 
244 See, e.g., State v. Field, 231 Or. App. 115, 124, 218 P.3d 551, 557 (2009) (“Based on 
all the circumstances, we conclude defendant did not unequivocally invoke his right to 
counsel at that time. Although, as part of his statements to Harvey, defendant observed that 
the situation was one where a lawyer would be needed, he continued talking to the officer, 
discussing the substantive issues of the investigation before the officer could ask any 
clarifying questions.”); State v. Kramyer, 222 Or. App. 193, 198–99, 194 P.3d 156, 159 
(2008) (finding suspect requested a lawyer but then reinitiated conversation with police). In 
the most recent case on the issue, State v. Wirkkala, 290 Or. App. 263, 269–70, 414 P.3d 
421, 425 (2018), the state unsuccessfully compared defendant’s conduct to that evaluated in 
Kramyer. 
245 State v. Sparklin, 296 Or. 85, 89, 672 P.2d 1182, 1184 (1983). 
246 Id. 
247 State v. Smith, 301 Or. 681, 683, 725 P.2d 894, 895 (1986). 
248 See State v. Brown, 100 Or. App. 204, 212–15, 785 P.2d 790, 795–96 (1990) (en 
banc) (Richardson, J., concurring) (discussing the “Mirandization” of article I, section 12). 
249 E.g., State v. Roble-Baker, 340 Or. 631, 638, 136 P.3d 22, 27 (2006). 
252 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97, 215 
Case law surrounding article I, section 12, indicates that the Oregon 
Supreme Court’s statement in Sparklin—that a single set of warnings 
is more convenient than any benefit gained from improving the 
warnings—is no longer applicable. The Oregon Supreme Court has 
indicated it is willing to provide more protection for criminal suspects 
under article I, section 12, than the United States Supreme Court 
provides under the Fifth Amendment. Requiring police officers to 
clarify ambiguous invocations of the right to have an attorney present 
during police questioning is just one example. Article I, section 12, 
requires police to provide a suspect with Miranda warnings when a 
suspect is in custody or in compelling circumstances, as opposed to the 
Fifth Amendment, which only requires warnings when a suspect is in 
custody.250 Additionally, the voluntariness test is very much alive and 
well in Oregon.251 Under the Fifth Amendment, “giving the warnings 
and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of 
admissibility; maintaining that a statement is involuntary even though 
given after warnings and voluntary waiver of rights requires unusual 
stamina, and litigation tends to end with the finding of valid waiver.”252 
Furthermore, improved warnings may be more consistent with 
Miranda itself. It honors the principle that a suspect must be given his 
rights and understand them before police can obtain a waiver. Because 
waiver must be both “knowing” and “voluntary,” police should be 
required to clarify the words needed to invoke a suspect’s rights under 
article I, section 12, in order to obtain a valid waiver. Otherwise, a 
suspect may not be as fully informed of his constitutional rights as other 
suspects who equivocally invoke. Additionally, if the warnings 
themselves were improved, perhaps there would be less reason for 
courts to decide issues of voluntariness. If suspects were more fully 
informed of their rights, and had the opportunity for those rights to be 
“clarified” to them if they failed to unequivocally invoke, there would 
be less reason to conduct post hoc inquiries into the circumstances of 
an interrogation. 
The additional language should clarify that if a suspect wishes to end 
interrogation, he must tell the officer that he no longer wants to answer 
250 Id. 
251 See, e.g., State v. Powell, 352 Or. 210, 230, 282 P.3d 845, 856 (2012); State v. Ely, 
237 Or. 329, 332, 390 P.2d 348, 349 (1964) (“In this state, confessions and admissions are 
initially deemed to be involuntary. Before either can be received into evidence, the state has 
the burden of showing that it was voluntarily made, without the inducement of either fear or 
hope.”). 
252 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608–09 (2004). 
2018] A Work in Progress: The “Mirandization” of Article I, Section 12 253
questions. The language should also clarify that if a suspect does not 
want to be interrogated without a lawyer present, she must tell the 
interrogating officers that she wants a lawyer. Such language should be 
short, straightforward, and easy to understand. For example, the added 
language could be: “If you’d like to end this interview at any time, or 
to consult an attorney during this interview, you should say, ‘I want an 
attorney’ or ‘I’m done talking.’” 
Requiring officers to tell suspects how to invoke their rights is 
consistent with constitutional principles already established. Article I, 
section 12, of the Oregon Constitution likely requires officers to clarify 
equivocal invocations.253 Telling suspects the exact words they must 
use to invoke their rights at the beginning of interrogation is consistent 
with the purposes of that requirement. Instead of waiting until the 
suspect makes an ambiguous statement, it makes sense to give the 
suspect all the information he or she needs at the outset of interrogation 
in order to “make a more informed decision, either to insist on silence 
or to cooperate. When the suspect knows that Miranda rights can be 
invoked at any time, he or she has the opportunity to reassess his or her 
immediate and long-term interests.”254 Thus, the duty to clarify is still 
present, and officers still must clarify ambiguous invocations made 
during interrogation. But, to ensure that every suspect enjoys the 
protections afforded by the duty to clarify, the warnings themselves 
should clarify how to invoke at the outset of interrogation. 
CONCLUSION 
The measure of validity for any constitutional rule is whether such a 
rule is applied equally in similar cases. Because Meade created an 
exception to the duty to clarify, not all suspects receive the benefits of 
clarification. Under Meade, some suspects may receive less 
information about their Miranda rights than others, even though each 
may have made equivocal requests for counsel. Thus, courts must not 
ask only “what the state’s guarantee means and how it applies to the 
case at hand.”255 Courts are also tasked with the duty to effectuate the 
purpose of constitutional rules—and by doing so, constantly improve 
constitutional rights. In adopting the duty to clarify, Oregon has 
decided to provide more protection for its citizens under article I, 
253 See discussion supra Part II. 
254 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 388 (2010). 
255 Linde, supra note 136, at 179. 
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section 12. Adding clarifying language to Miranda warnings simply 
ensures that (1) suspects have the tools they need to control 
interrogation if they wish, and (2) every person who—for whatever 
reason—does not clearly invoke his or her rights nevertheless receives 
the benefits of clarification. 
